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BYZANTINE FAULT TOLERANT DISTRIBUTED QUICKEST CHANGE
DETECTION
ERHAN BAYRAKTAR AND LIFENG LAI
Abstract. We introduce and solve the problem of Byzantine fault tolerant distributed quickest
change detection in both continuous and discrete time setups. In this problem, multiple sensors
sequentially observe random signals from the environment and send their observations to a control
center that will determine whether there is a change in the statistical behavior of the observations.
We assume that the signals are independent and identically distributed across sensors. An unknown
subset of sensors are compromised and will send arbitrarily modified and even artificially generated
signals to the control center. It is shown that the performance of the the so-called CUSUM statistic,
which is optimal when all sensors are honest, will be significantly degraded in the presence of
even a single dishonest sensor. In particular, instead of in a logarithmically the detection delay
grows linearly with the average run length (ARL) to false alarm. To mitigate such a performance
degradation, we propose a fully distributed low complexity detection scheme. We show that the
proposed scheme can recover the log scaling. We also propose a centralized group-wise scheme that
can further reduce the detection delay.
1. Introduction
In the quickest change detection problem, one observes a sequence of observations, whose prob-
ability density function (pdf) might change at an unknown time [15]. The goal in this problem
is to detect the presence of such a change with a minimum delay under certain false alarm con-
straints. This type of problem has a broad range of potential applications, such as quality control
[16], security [21, 18], wireless communications [7], and chemical or biological attack detection, etc.
In recent years, motivated by the rapid development of wireless sensor networks, distributed
quickest detection has attracted much interest [25, 26, 11, 14, 24, 22, 20, 23, 3]. In such networks,
multiple sensors are deployed to facilitate the detection of abnormal activities. These sensors will
send observations to a fusion center which will then make final detect decisions [27, 2]. In the
existing distributed quickest change detection setup, the sensors are assumed to always report true
observations. In certain applications, especially in the attack detection applications, sensors might
be compromised. As a result, the compromised sensors might send modified or even artificially gen-
erated observations. In this paper, we consider the quickest detection problem under such Byzantine
attacks. The problems studied in this paper are related to the Byzantine fault tolerance problems [8]
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in which a component will fail in an arbitrary manner (instead of just stopping functioning). Our
goal is to design Byzantine fault tolerant quickest detection schemes.
More specifically, we consider a setup with N sensors, an unknown subset of which might be
compromised by adversaries. These sensors observe signals sequentially from the environment. We
assume that the signals are independent and identically distributed across sensors. If a sensor is
honest, it will send its observations to a control center. If a sensor is compromised, it will send
modified observations to the control center. We do not make any assumption on how the attacker
will modify its observations. We consider a non-Bayesian setup in which the statistical behavior
of the random observations from the environment will change at an unknown but fixed time. The
goal of the control center is detect the presence of such a change based on the signals received from
all sensors.
If all sensors are honest, it is well known that the cumulative sum (CUSUM) strategy is optimal
under Lorden’s setup [9]. We first show that the performance of CUSUM will be significantly
degraded even if only one sensor is compromised. In particular, using a simple attack, the attacker
can make the detection delay of CUSUM scale linearly with the average run length (ARL) to false
alarm (see Proposition 3.1), while the detection delay of CUSUM scales in a logaritmaically with
ARL to false alarm when there is no attacker.
To overcome such a performance degradation, we propose a low complexity, low communication
overhead detection scheme. In this scheme, we ask each sensor to run a CUSUM locally using its
own observed signal, and send one bit of indication to the control center once its CUSUM stops.
The control center will raise a final alarm once it receives alarms from at least two sensors. We call
this scheme the “second-alarm” strategy/scheme. Using tools from order statistics [4], we provide
an upper-bound on the detection delay and an lower-bound on the ARL to false alarm that are valid
under arbitrary attack strategies. We show that the derived upper-bound on the detection delay
scales logarithmically with that of the lower-bound on the ARL to false alarm; see Theorems 3.2
and 4.1. This implies that the proposed second-alarm strategy successfully recovers the logarithmic
scaling. Furthermore, this scheme can be implemented in a fully distributed manner.
To further reduce the detection delay, we propose a group-wise strategy. In this group-wise
strategy, we divide sensors into three groups. Each group will run a CUSUM using signals received
in its group and raise an alarm once its CUSUM stops. The control center then raises the final
alarm once at least two groups raise alarms. We show that the detection delay of the group-wise
strategy scales in a logarithmically with the ARL to false alarm. Furthermore, the pre-log factor of
the group-wise strategy is smaller; see Theorems 3.7 and 4.2. The main intuition for the deduction
of the detection delay in the group-wise strategy is that CUSUM in each group can raise an alarm
faster than CUSUM in each individual sensor. The disadvantage is that the group-wise strategy is
not amenable to distributed implementation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the models
discussed in the paper. In Section 3, we study the continuous-time Brownian motion model. In
Section 4, we discuss the discrete-time model.
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2. Problem Formulation
Figure 1 illustrates the model under consideration. Consider a system with N ≥ 3 sensors that
are deployed to monitor the environment. We assume that one sensor might be compromised. The
schemes discussed in the paper can be properly modified to handle multiple compromised sensors.
We use nc to denote the index of the compromised sensor. The value of nc is unknown. We
assume that the sensors are connected with a fusion center, which will make detection decisions
based on the observations from the sensors. Each sensor n ∈ {1, · · · , N} observes {ξ(n)t ; t ≥ 0}.
Let ξ¯
(n)
t be the signal sensor n reports to the fusion center. If sensor n is honest, ξ¯
(n)
t = ξ
(n)
t . For
the compromised sensor nc, ξ¯
(nc)
t depends on the attacker’s attack strategy s, which can use the
information ξ
(nc)
t observed by the attacker. We do not make any assumption on the attack strategy.
We take F = ⋃t≥0 Ft, where Ft = σ{(ξ¯(1)s , · · · , ξ¯(N)s ) ; s ≤ t}. The goal of the fusion center is to
detect the presence of a change in the environment based on the processes (ξ¯
(1)
t , · · · , ξ¯(N)t ).
With a little of abuse of notation, we use the following modified Lorden’s performance index as
the delay measure
d(T ) = sup
τ,nc,s
esssupEτ,nc,s[(T − τ)+|Fτ ].
Here esssup denotes the essential supremum, the L∞ norm, and T is the stopping rule that the
fusion center uses to raise an alarm. Eτ,nc,s{(T − τ)+|Fτ} is the expectation under the measure
when the change occurs at time τ , the compromised sensor is nc and the compromised sensor uses
the attack strategy s. We will use Eτ,0,φ[·] to denote the expectation under the measure when
the change occurs at time τ and all sensors are honest. We will also use E∞ and E0 to denote
the expectations with regards to one honest sensor when the change points occurs at ∞ and 0
respectively.
We also have the following average run length (ARL) to false alarm measure
ARL(T ) = inf
nc,s
E∞,nc,s[T ].
Here E∞,nc,s[T ] denotes the expectation under the measure when the change does not occur, the
compromised sensor is nc and the compromised sensor uses the attack strategy s.
With the above defined metrics, we aim to solve the following optimization problem
inf
T
d(T )
such that ARL(T ) ≥ γ.
(2.1)
In other words, we aim to design a stopping rule that minimizes the detection delay while making
sure that ARL to false alarm is larger than a given threshold γ.
In this paper, we will focus on two different signal models: a continuous-time Brownian motion
model and a discrete-time model.
In the Brownian motion model, we have
ξ
(n)
t = µ(t− τ)+ +W (n)t ,
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Figure 1. Model
where τ is an unknown constant at which signals observed at all sensors change, µ is the sig-
nal strength at each node after the change,
{
W
(n)
t
}
n∈{1,···N}
are independent standard Brownian
motions.
In the discrete-time model, the time t takes integer values, and we have the following probability
density functions (pdf)
ξ
(n)
t ∼
{
f0, t ≤ τ,
f1, t > τ.
Here f0 is the pdf of each observation before the change and f1 is the pdf of each observation after
the change.
3. Continuous-time Brownian Motion Model
In this section, we will first discuss the impact on the CUSUM test of the presence of a single
attacker. We show that, instead of scaling logarithmically, the detection delay of CUSUM scales
linearly with ARL to false alarm under a simple attack. We then propose a fully distributed scheme
that allows us to recover the logarithmic scaling. We further design a centralized scheme that allows
us to further reduce the detection delay.
3.1. Impact on the CUSUM test. We first show that the presence of even a single attacker has
significant impact on the performance of CUSUM.
When all nodes are honest, i.e., ξ¯
(n)
t = ξ
(n)
t , ∀n, the non-Bayesian quickest change detection
problem under Lorden’s performance index has been well understood. The optimal solution is the
continuous-time version of Page’s CUSUM stopping rule; see e.g. [1, 17]. In particular, if we define
(3.1) yt = ut −mt,
with
ut =
N∑
n=1
µξ¯
(n)
t −
1
2
Nµ2t,
mt = inf
0≤s≤t
us,
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then, the CUSUM stopping rule is
Tν = inf{t ≥ 0; yt ≥ ν},(3.2)
where ν is a threshold such that
(3.3) ARL(Tν) = E∞,0,φ[Tν ] =
2(eν − ν − 1)
Nµ2
= γ.
is optimal for (2.1) for the case when there is no adversary. For this scheme, the detection delay is
(3.4) d(Tν) =
2(e−ν + ν − 1)
Nµ2
.
From here, we know that when the ARL constraint γ ↑ ∞, we have
d(Tν) =
2
Nµ2
[
log(ARL(Tν)) + log
Nµ2
2
− 1 + o(1)
]
.(3.5)
This means that the detection delay scales logarithmically with ARL.
Now suppose one of the sensors is compromised, but the fusion center still employs the CUSUM
test in (3.2) to detect the change, then a simple attack will significantly degrade the performance
of CUSUM. In this attack, the attacker chooses to set nc = 1, and generates ξ¯
(1)
t according to the
following dynamics irrespective of ξ
(1)
t
ξ¯
(1)
t = Nt+W
(1)
t , t ≥ 0.(3.6)
We use s∗ to denote this particular attack strategy, and use P0,1,s∗ to denote the probability measure
when the change point occurs at time 0, and P∞,1,s∗ to denote the probability measure when the
change point never occurs.
The impact of this simple attack on the performance of the CUSUM test (3.2) is computed in
the following proposition.
Proposition 3.1. Under the attack strategy specified in (3.6), the ARL to false alarm and the
detection delay of CUSUM (3.2) are:
ARL(Tν) ≤ E∞,1,s∗ [Tν ] = (e
−ν + ν − 1)
Nµ2/2
,
and
(3.7) d(Tν) ≥ E0,1,s∗ [Tν ] ≥ (e
−ν + ν − 1)
(3N/2 − 1)µ2 ,
respectively. As a result, instead of logarithmically, the detection delay of CUSUM scales linearly
with ARL to false alarm under a simple attack.
Proof. For ut, we have
ut =
N∑
n=1
µξ¯
(n)
t −
1
2
Nµ2t = µ
N∑
n=1
ξ¯
(n)
t −
1
2
Nµ2t.
Under probability measure P0,1,s∗ , the process ξt =
∑N
n=1 ξ¯
(n)
t can be written as
ξt = (2N − 1)µt+
√
NWt,
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for some standard Brownian motion Wt. As a result, under P0,1,s∗
ut = (3N/2 − 1)µ2t+
√
NµWt.
Now following the techniques introduced in [13], we will compute E0,1,s∗ [Tν ]. Let us denote
f(y) = y + e−y − 1.
It is easy to check that
f
′
(y) = 1− e−y, f ′′(y) = e−y, f ′(y) + f ′′(y) = 1, f ′(0) = f(0) = 0,
and f
′′
(y) > 0, ∀y.
Applying Itoˆ’s rule, we obtain
f(yt)− f(0) =
∫ t
0
f
′
(yt)(dut − dmt) +
∫ t
0
N
2
µ2f
′′
(yt)dt
=
∫ t
0
(3N/2 − 1)µ2f ′(yt)dt+
∫ t
0
√
Nµf
′
(yt)dWt −
∫ t
0
f
′
(yt)dmt +
∫ t
0
N
2
µ2f
′′
(yt)dt.
Using f ′(0) = 0 we obtain that − ∫ t0 f ′(yt)dmt = 0. Hence, we are left with
f(yt)− f(0) =
∫ t
0
(3N/2 − 1)µ2f ′(yt)dt+
∫ t
0
√
Nµf
′
(yt)dWt +
∫ t
0
N
2
µ2f
′′
(yt)dt
(a)
≤
∫ t
0
(3N/2 − 1)µ2(f ′(yt) + f ′′(yt))dt+
∫ t
0
√
Nµf
′
(yt)dWt
(b)
= (3N/2 − 1)µ2t+
∫ t
0
√
Nµf
′
(yt)dWt,(3.8)
in which (a) in the above equation is due to the fact that f
′′
(y) > 0, and (b) is due to the fact that
f
′
(y) + f
′′
(y) = 1. Now, (3.7) easily follows by evaluating (3.8) at Tν and noticing the second term
in (3.8) is 0. The computation of E∞,1,s∗[Tν ] is similar to that of [13]. In particular, one can define
g(y) = −y + ey − 1,
and then follow the similar steps as above. 
3.2. A Fully Distributed Byzantine Attack Resistant Change Detection Scheme. In this
section, we propose an intuitive scheme that enables us to recover the logarithmic scaling. In this
scheme, the fusion center first runs N independent CUSUMs, T
(n)
h , n = 1, · · · , N , one for each
signal ξ¯
(n)
t received from sensor n:
T
(n)
h = inf{t ≥ 0; y
(n)
t ≥ h},
in which
y
(n)
t = µξ¯
(n)
t −
1
2
µ2t− inf
s≤t
(
µξ¯(n)s −
1
2
µ2s
)
.
We call T
(n)
h the time at which sensor n raises an alarm. In our scheme, the fusion center will ignore
the first alarm from sensors, and will raise the final alarm once a second sensor raises an alarm.
Let Th be the time when the fusion center raises the final alarm. From the description above, we
know that Th is the same as the second order statistics of N i.i.d. random variables T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N)h .
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Following the notation in order statistics [4], we use T(2),N to denote the second order statistics of
N random variables T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N)h . As a result, the time at which the fusion center raises an alarm
is Th , T(2),N .
Now, we analyze the detection delay d(Th) and ARL to false alarm ARL(Th). We have the
following result:
Theorem 3.2. The detection delay of Th scales with ARL at most logarithmically:
d(Th) ≤ 4
µ2
(
log(ARL(Th)) + log
(N − 1)µ2
2
− 1 + o(1)
)
.
Proof. We first provide a lower bound on ARL to false alarm that is valid for any attacker’s strategy.
From the attacker’s perspective, to reduce ARL to false alarm of the proposed scheme, it should
make the compromised sensor to raise an alarm as soon as possible. The proposed scheme will
then raise a false alarm when one of the remaining N − 1 honest sensors raises an alarm under
the probability measure P∞,N,s. Since all sensors are identical, for the purpose of performance
evaluation, we can simply assume that sensor N is compromised. Let T(1),N−1 be the first order
statistics of T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h , namely T(1),N−1 , min
{
T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h
}
. From the discussion
above, we have ARL(Th) ≥ E∞,N,s{T(1),N−1}.
In the following, we use an estimate of E∞;N ;s{T(1),N−1} due to [5]. For completeness and in
preparation for other estimates, we present the main steps of proof from [5] as well. Since T(1),N−1
is a positive random variable, we have
ARL(Th) ≥E∞,N,s{T(1),N−1}
=
∫ ∞
0
P∞,N,s(T(1),N−1 ≥ t)dt
=
∫ ∞
0
P∞,N,s
(
min
{
T
(1)
h , · · · , T
(N−1)
h
}
≥ t
)
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
[
P∞(T
(1)
h ≥ t)
]N−1
dt.
The last equality is due to the fact that for those sensors not affected by the attacker, T
(n)
h are i.i.d.
random variables.
Next, we provide an upper-bound on the detection delay that holds for any strategy of the
attacker. Clearly, to increase the detection delay of the proposed scheme, the attacker should use
a strategy that does not raise an alarm. In this case, the fusion center will raise an alarm only
when at least two honest sensors raise alarms under the probability measure P0. Again, for the
performance evaluation purpose, we can simply assume that sensor N is compromised.
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Let T(2),N−1 be the second order statistics of T
(1)
h , · · · , T
(N−1)
h . Based on the discussion above,
we have
d(Th) ≤ E0,N,s{T(2),N−1}
=
∫ ∞
0
P0,N,s(T(2),N−1 ≥ t)dt
=
∫ ∞
0
P0,N,s
{
at most 1 of T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h is less than t
}
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
P0,N,s
{
none of T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h is less than t
}
dt
+
∫ ∞
0
P0,N,s
{
1 of T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h is less than t
}
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
P0,N,s
(
min
{
T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h
}
≥ t
)
dt+
∫ ∞
0
P0,N,s
{
1 of T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h is less than t
}
dt
=
∫ ∞
0
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ t)
]N−1
dt+
∫ ∞
0
(N − 1)(1 − P0(T (1)h ≥ t))
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ t)
]N−2
dt,
in which the first inequality is due to the non-negativity of y
(n)
t which implies the worst case delay
will occur when y
(n)
t , n = 1, · · · , N−1 are 0 at the time of the change (τ = 0 satisfies the condition).
To proceed, let us recall the following result from [10]:
P0(T
(n)
h ≥ t) = 2e
h
2
∑
k≥1
u(φk)e
− µ
2t
8 cos2(φk) ,(3.9)
P∞(T
(n)
h ≥ t) = 2e−
h
2
∑
k≥1
u(θk)e
− µ
2t
8 cos2(θk) + 2e−
h
2 v(η)e
− µ
2t
8 cosh2(η) ,(3.10)
where
u(x) =
sin3 x
x− sinx cos x, v(x) =
sinh3 x
sinhx cosh x− x,
and the constants φk, θk, and η are defined as the solutions of
tanφk = −2φk
h
< 0, tan θk =
2θk
h
> 0, and tanh η =
2η
h
> 0,
respectively. With these results, we continue our estimations.
ARL(Th) ≥
∫ ∞
0
[
P∞(T
(1)
h ≥ t)
]N−1
dt
=
∫ ∞
0

2e−h2 ∑
k≥1
u(θk)e
− µ
2t
8 cos2(θk) + 2e−
h
2 v(η)e
− µ
2t
8 cosh2(η)


N−1
dt
(a)
=
2
(N − 1)µ2 [e
h + “lower exponents”],
(3.11)
in which (a) in (3.11) is true due to (80) of [5].
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As for E0,N,s{T(2),N−1}, it is obvious that P0,N,s(T(2),N−1 ≥ t) is a non-increasing function of N .
Hence from (3.2), we have
d(Th) ≤E0,N,s{T(2),N−1}
=
∫ ∞
0
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ t)
]N−1
dt
+
∫ ∞
0
(N − 1)(1 − P0(T (1)h ≥ t))
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ t)
]N−2
dt
≤
∫ ∞
0
[P0(T
(1)
h ≥ t)]2dt+
∫ ∞
0
2(1− P0(T (1)h ≥ t))P0(T (1)h ≥ t)dt
=2
∫ ∞
0
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ t)dt−
∫ ∞
0
[P0(T
(1)
h ≥ t)]2dt
=
4(e−h + h− 1)
µ2
−
∫ ∞
0
[P0(T
(1)
h ≥ t)]2dt
≤4(e
−h + h− 1)
µ2
.
It now follows that d(Th) grows logarithmically with ARL(Th). 
Remark 3.3. The bounds derived in the proof are valid for any strategy of the attacker, who can
use an arbitrarily complicated attack strategy and can arbitrarily change its behavior over time.
Remark 3.4. This scheme is amenable to a fully distributed implementation with very little
communication overhead. In particular, each sensor n can run T
(n)
h locally, and send an alarm
(one bit) to the fusion center once y
(n)
t is larger than the threshold h. The fusion center will raise
a final alarm after receiving the second alarm from the sensors.
Remark 3.5. The proposed scheme also works for the scenario in which the Brownian motion
observed by each sensor has different drift and volatility coefficients. The analysis follows the same
steps as above but with more complicated computations.
Remark 3.6. The proposed second-alarm strategy can be modified for the case with more than
1 sensor or the case with an unknown number of sensors might be compromised, as long as we
know an upper-bound Nmax on the maximum number of sensors that might be compromised and
Nmax < N/2. In particular, the fusion center can employ Nmax + 1-alarm strategy, in which the
fusion center will raise the final alarm once it receives Nmax + 1 alarms from the sensors. The
condition Nmax < N/2 is necessary for the revised strategy, as the revised strategy will never raise
an alarm if Nmax > N/2 and the attacker simply make the affected sensors all silent.
3.3. A Group-Wise Scheme. The scheme presented in Section 3.2 can be implemented in a fully
distributed manner and the detection delay scales with ARL in a log order. However, compared
with the case in which there is no dishonest sensor or the case in which the identity of the dishonest
sensor is known, the pre-log factor of the scheme in Section 3.2 is larger, which implies that the delay
increases faster with the ARL constraint. In particular, if there is no dishonest sensor, from (3.5),
we know the pre-log factor is 2/(Nµ2). If we know the identity of the dishonest sensor, then the
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problem is reduced to a case with N −1 honest sensors. Again from (3.5), we know that the pre-log
factor is 2/((N − 1)µ2). On the other hand, the pre-log factor of the fully distributed scheme
discussed in Section 3.2 is 4/µ2. In this section, we propose a modified scheme that achieves a
better slope that decreases with increasing N .
In the modified scheme, we evenly divide these N sensors into 3 groups, each with N/3 sensors.
Here we assume that N can be divided by 3. The scheme can be easily modified if N cannot be
divided by 3. We use Gi, i = 1, 2, 3 to denote each group of sensors. For each group Gi, we run the
following scheme:
T Gih = inf{t ≥ 0; yGit ≥ h},
in which
yGit = u
Gi
t −mGit
with
uGit =
∑
n∈Gi
µξ¯
(n)
t −
1
2
N
3
µ2t, and mGit = inf
0≤s≤t
uGis .
In our scheme, the fusion center will raise an alarm when at least two out of these three groups
raise alarms. In other words, TGh , the time when the fusion center raises an alarm, is T
G
(2),3, the
second order statistic of three random variables T G1h , T
G2
h , T
G3
h .
Now, we analyze the detection delay d(TGh ) and ARL to false alarm ARL(T
G
h ). We have the
following result:
Theorem 3.7. The detection delay TGh scales logarithmically with ARL in the following manner:
d(TGh ) ≤
12
µ2N
(
log(ARL(TGh )) + log
Nµ2
3
− 1 + o(1)
)
.
Proof. The proof follows that of Theorem 3.2 with only minor modification. In particular, in the
group-wise scheme, uGit has a drift of −µ2N/6 before the change, µ2N/6 after the change, and its
standard deviation is µ
√
N/3. Following the steps in the proof of Theorem 3.2, we obtain the
estimate
ARL(TGh ) ≥ E∞,N,s{TG(1),2} =
3
µ2N
[
eh + “lower exponents”
]
.
Similarly,
d(TGh ) ≤ E0,N,s{TG(2),2} ≤ 2E0,N,s{T G1h } =
2
µ2N/6
(e−h + h− 1).
The statement of the theorem easily follows from the above two estimates. 
Remark 3.8. This modified scheme achieves a smaller detection delay than the one discussed in
Section 3.2. However, this modified scheme is a centralized scheme as the fusion center needs signals
from all sensor in each group.
Remark 3.9. One may wonder whether we can further divide the sensors into two groups instead of
three. There are some potential issues with dividing the sensors into two groups. If one employs the
the second-alarm scheme, the attacker can make the detection delay arbitrarily long by generating
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a Brownian motion with a sufficiently small negative drift. In this way, the combined signal in the
group containing the attacker will not raise an alarm (or will raise an alarm very late) even if there
is a true change in the environment. If, instead of using the second-alarm scheme, we opt to use
the usual CUSUM scheme of Section 3.1, then the attacker can make ARL to false alarm very short
by generating a Brownian motion with a sufficiently large positive drift.
4. Discrete-time Model
In this section, we discuss the discrete-time model for quickest change detection with compromised
sensors. We follow the same structure as in the Brownian motion model. In this section, to follow
conventional notation, we will use k to denote time t.
4.1. The CUSUM Test. Similar to the Brownian motion case, when all nodes are honest, the
non-Bayesian quickest change detection problem under Lorden’s performance index has been well
understood. The optimal solution is Page’s CUSUM stopping rule [12]. In particular, define
yk = uk −mk,(4.1)
with
uk =
k∑
l=1
N∑
n=1
log
{
f1(ξ
(n)
l )
f0(ξ
(n)
l )
}
,
k∑
l=1
N∑
n=1
Z
(n)
l ,
mk = min
1≤j≤k
uj .
Here, k is the time index. We assume that the second moment of Z(n)s for n = 1, · · · , N under f1
are finite. The CUSUM stopping rule is
Tν = inf{k ≥ 1; yk ≥ ν}(4.2)
where ν is a threshold such that
E∞,0,φ[Tν ] = γ.
The performance evaluation of the discrete-time CUSUM is more involved than that of the
Brownian motion model, mainly because of the possibility of overshoot. Define
κ = lim
ν→∞
E0,0,φ{yTν − ν},(4.3)
β = E0,0,φ{m∞},(4.4)
R = lim
ν→∞
E0,0,φ{exp[−uην − ν]},(4.5)
with
ην = inf{k : uk ≥ ν}.
From [19] one has
ARL(Tν) = E∞,0,φ[Tν ] =
1
R2ND(f1||f0)e
ν [1 + o(1)],
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in which D(f1||f0) is the Kullback-Leibler distance between f1 and f0. In addition, from [19], one
has
d(Tν) = E0,0,φ[Tν ] =
1
ND(f1||f0) (ν + β + κ) + o(1).
4.2. A Fully Distributed Byzantine Attack Resistant Change Detection Scheme. Here,
we show that a scheme modified from the one discussed in Section 3.2 enables us to recover the
logarithmic scaling between the detection delay and average run length. In this scheme, the fusion
center first runs N independent CUSUM T
(n)
h s, one for each signal ξ¯
(n)
k received from sensor n:
T
(n)
h = inf{k ≥ 1; y(n)k ≥ h},
in which
y
(n)
k = u
(n)
k −m(n)k ,(4.6)
with
u
(n)
k =
k∑
l=1
log
{
f1(ξ¯
(n)
l )
f0(ξ¯
(n)
l )
}
,
k∑
l=1
Z
(n)
l ,
m
(n)
k = min1≤j≤k
u
(n)
j .
Similar to the Brownian motion model, the fusion center will raise the final alarm when two
alarms are raised from these N CUSUMs. That is, Th, the time the fusion center raises the final
alarm, is the same as T(2),N , the second order statistics of N random variables T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N)h .
Now, we analyze the detection delay d(Th) and ARL to false alarm, which we denote by ARL(Th).
Theorem 4.1. The detection delay of Th scales logarithmically with ARL :
d(Th) ≤ 2
D(f1||f0)
(
logARL(Th) + log
(1− exp(1−N))R21D(f1||f0)
exp(1−N) + β1 + κ1
)
+ o(1).
Proof. The proof follows a structure similar to the Brownian motion case. We first provide a lower
bound for ARL to false alarm for any strategy the attacker might use. From the attacker’s perspec-
tive, to reduce the ARL to false alarm of the proposed scheme, it should make the compromised
sensor to raise an alarm as soon as possible. The proposed scheme will then raise a false alarm when
one of the remaining N − 1 sensors raises an alarm under the probability measure P∞. Since all
sensors are identical, for the evaluation of the performance purpose, we can simply assume sensor
N is compromised. Again, let T(1),N−1 , min
{
T
(1)
h , · · · , T
(N−1)
h
}
be the first order statistics of
T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h . From the discussion above, we have ARL(Th) ≥ E∞,N,s{T(1),N−1}. Following the
same steps as those in the Brownian motion case, we have
ARL(Th) ≥ E∞,N,s{T(1),N−1} =
∞∑
k=1
[
P∞(T
(1)
h ≥ k)
]N−1
.(4.7)
Now, we provide an upper-bound for the detection delay under any attack. Clearly, to increase
the detection delay of the proposed scheme, the attacker should use a strategy that does not raise
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an alarm. In this case, the fusion center will raise an alarm only when at least two honest sensors
raise alarms under the probability measure P0. Since all sensors are identical, for the evaluation of
the performance purpose, we can simply assume sensor N is compromised.
Let T(2),N−1 be the second order statistics of T
(1)
h , · · · , T (N−1)h . Based on the discussion above,
and follow the same steps as those in the Brownian motion case, we have
d(Th) ≤E0,N,s{T(2),N−1}
=
∞∑
k=1
P0,N,s(T(2),N−1 ≥ k)
=
∞∑
k=1
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ k)
]N−1
+
∞∑
k=1
(N − 1)(1 − P0(T (1)h ≥ k))
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ k)
]N−2
.
Unlike the Brownian motion case, closed form expressions for P0(T
(1)
h ≥ k) and P∞(T
(1)
h ≥ k)
are unknown. However, it has been shown in [6] that a properly normalized T
(1)
h has a geometric
distribution under P∞. In particular, letting
C =
1
R21D(f1||f0)
eh[1 + o(1)],
we have
lim
h→∞
P∞
{
T
(1)
h
C
≥ k
}
= exp(−k).
Here, R1 is the quantity corresponds to (4.5) when there is only one observation sequence.
We continue the computation.
T(1),N−1 = min
{
T
(1)
h , · · · , T
(N−1)
h
}
= Cmin
{
T
(1)
h /C, · · · , T
(N−1)
h /C
}
.
Following (4.7), we have
ARL(Th) ≥E∞,N,s{T(1),N−1}
=C
∞∑
k=1
[
P∞(T
(1)
h /C ≥ k)
]N−1
=C
∞∑
k=1
exp(−(N − 1)k)
=
exp(1−N)
1− exp(1−N)C
=
exp(1−N)
(1− exp(1−N))R21D(f1||f0)
eh[1 + o(1)].
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Now, for d(Th), as the Brownian motion case, P0(T(2),N−1 ≥ k) is a non-increasing function of
N . Hence from (4.2), we have
d(Th) ≤E0,N,s{T(2),N−1}
=
∞∑
k=1
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ k)
]N−1
+
∞∑
k=1
(N − 1)(1 − P0(T (1)h ≥ k))
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ k)
]N−2
≤
∞∑
k=1
[
P0(T
(1)
h ≥ k)
]2
+
∞∑
k=1
2(1− P0(T (1)h ≥ k))P0(T (1)h ≥ k)
=
∞∑
k=1
2P0(T
(1)
h ≥ k)−
∞∑
k=1
P 20 (T
(1)
h ≥ k)
=
2
D(f1||f0)(h+ β1 + κ1) + o(1) −
∞∑
k=1
P 20 (T
(1)
h ≥ k)
≤ 2
D(f1||f0)(h+ β1 + κ1) + o(1),
in which κ1 and β1 are the quantities corresponding to (4.3) and (4.4) when there is only one
observation sequence.
As a result, we see that d{Th} grows logarithmically with ARL{Th}. 
4.3. Group-Wise Scheme. Similar to the Brownian motion case, we can design a group-wise
scheme that has a smaller detection delay. In particular, we evenly divide these N sensors into 3
groups, each with N/3 sensors. For each group Gi, we run the following scheme:
T Gih = inf{k ≥ 1; yGik ≥ h},
in which
yGik = u
Gi
k −mGik
with
uGik =
k∑
l=1
∑
n∈Gi
log
{
f1(ξ
(n)
l )
f0(ξ
(n)
l )
}
, mGik = min1≤j≤k
uGij .
In our scheme, the fusion center will raise an alarm when at least two out of these three groups
raise alarms. In other words, TGh , the time when the fusion center raises an alarm, is T
G
(2),3, the
second order statistic of three random variables T G1h , T
G2
h , T
G3
h . Regarding this group-wise scheme,
we have the following result.
Theorem 4.2. For the group-wise scheme, the detection delay scales with ARL to false alarm in
the following manner:
d(TGh ) ≤
2
D(f1||f0)N/3
(
logARL(TGh ) + log
(1− exp(−1))R2GD(f1||f0)N/3
exp(−1) + βG + κG
)
+ o(1),
in which βG, κG and RG are quantities corresponding to (4.3), (4.4) and (4.5) when there are N/3
sequences.
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Proof. The proof follows closely with that of Theorem 4.1, with the difference that when all sensors
in G1 are honest, for T
G1
h , we have
d(T G1h ) =
1
D(f1||f0)N/3(h+ βG + κG) + o(1),(4.8)
and T G1h /CG is geometrically distributed under P∞,0,φ, in which
CG =
1
R2GD(f1||f0)N/3
eh[1 + o(1)],(4.9)
and
lim
h→∞
P∞,0,φ
{
T G1h
CG
≥ k
}
= exp(−k).(4.10)
Following the same steps in the proof of Theorem 4.1, we obtain
ARL(TGh ) ≥
exp(−1)
(1− exp(−1))R2GD(f1||f0)N/3
eh[1 + o(1)].(4.11)
and
d(TGh ) ≤
2
D(f1||f0)N/3(h+ βG + κG) + o(1).(4.12)

5. Numerical Examples
In this section, we present several examples to illustrate the analytical results presented in this
paper. In generating these figures, we consider the worst case scenario, in which we give the attacker
additional information and allow the attacker to change its attack strategy. In particular, when we
run the simulation to evaluate ARL, we have the attacher make the affected sensor raise an alarm
immediately. When we run the simulation to evaluate delay, we have the attacker keep the affected
sensor silent. Hence, the curves we presented here are the worst case curves.
Figure 3 illustrates the relationship between the detection delay and ARL for the continuous-
time Brownian motion case. In generating this figure, we set the number of sensors N to be 9,
the drift after the change µ to be 1. From the figure, one can see that the detection delay scales
logarithmically with ARL for both distributed and group-wise schemes. Furthermore, the delay and
its slope of the group-wise scheme are smaller than those of the distributed scheme. This illustrates
the benefits of the group-wise scheme. However, as discussed in the paper, the communication
overhead of the group-wise scheme is significantly higher than that of the fully distributed scheme.
Figure 3 illustrates the ratio between the detection delay of the proposed scheme and that of
the case with N − 1 = 8 honest sensor for the continuous-time Brownian motion case. Based on
asymptotic results discussed in Section 3, this ratio should not be larger than
4/µ2
2/[(N − 1)µ2] = 2(N − 1) = 16
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Figure 2. Detection delay vs ARL for the continuous-time Brownian motion case
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Figure 3. Detection delay ratio for the continuous-time Brownian motion case
for the distributed scheme, and not larger than
12/(Nµ2)
2/[(N − 1)µ2] = 6
N − 1
N
= 16/3
for the group-wise scheme. From the figure, we can see that the ratios are indeed smaller than these
numbers. Furthermore, compared with the upper-bound obtained in this paper, we can see from
the figure that the actual performance of the proposed schemes is even better in practice.
Figure 4 illustrates the relationship between the detection delay and ARL for the discrete-time
case. In generating this figure, we set the pre-change pdf f0 to be Gaussian with mean 0 and
variance 1, and set the after-change pdf f1 to be Gaussian with mean 1 and variance 1. Same as
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Figure 4. Detection delay vs ARL for the discrete time case
the continuous-time case, we set the number of sensors N to be 9. From the figure, one can again
see that the detection delay scales logarithmically with ARL for both distributed and group-wise
schemes. Furthermore, we can also see that the delay and its slope of the group-wise scheme are
smaller than those of the distributed scheme.
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